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Abstract
This paper analyzes the relationship between capital structure, corporate tax-
ation and rm age. We adapt a standard model of optimal capital structure
choice under corporate taxation, focusing on the nancing and investment de-
cisions a young rm is typically faced with. Our model allows to derive testable
hypotheses about the relationship between corporate taxation, a rm's age and
its debt to asset ratio. To test these hypotheses empirically, we use a cross-
section of 405,000 rms from 35 European countries and 126 NACE 3-digit
industries. In line with previous research, we nd that a rm's debt ratio in-
creases with the corporate tax rate. Further, we observe that older rms exhibit
smaller debt ratios than their younger counterparts. Finally, consistent with
our theoretical expectation, we nd a positive interaction eect between cor-
porate taxation and rm age, indicating that the impact of corporate taxation
on debt is increasing over a rm's life-time.
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11 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) and Miller (1977)
there is a vast amount of literature dealing with the optimal nancing struc-
ture of rms under corporate income taxation (see Graham 2003, for a com-
prehensive survey). Accordingly, rms are weighing the marginal tax benets
induced by the deductibility of interest payments on debt against the marginal
nancial costs of debt when determining their 'target' leverage ratio.
The tax-induced benets of debt are increasing with the statutory corpo-
rate tax rate. The costs of debt are typically assumed to increase with the
debt level but not with other rm characteristics. However, there is an emi-
nent line of research indicating that the costs of debt nancing are changing
over the life-cycle of a rm. For instance, rms in their start-up phase ('young'
rms) typically lack sucient internal funds to nance investment (see, e.g.,
Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2004, Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004),
and, due to uncertainty and information asymmetries, have limited access to
equity nancing (see, e.g., Diamond 1991, Berger and Udell 1998, Fuest, Hu-
ber and Nielsen 2002, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt 2006).1 Therefore, younger
rms have to rely more on debt than older rms (see, Berger and Udell 1998
and Gordon and Lee 2001, for empirical evidence). Another reason for the
diminishing importance of debt is that protable mature rms tend to have
more internal funds (i.e., retained earnings) available. They reduce their re-
liance on debt, although the costs of external debt nancing might decrease
with the maturity of a rm (e.g., banks might reduce the interest rate for 'sur-
viving' rms; Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 1988, Petersen and Rajan 1994,
provide empirical evidence). Consequently, if it holds that the costs of debt
and, therefore, the reliance on debt nancing is changing with the age of a
rm, we would also expect that the impact of taxes on a rm's debt policy is
varying over its life-time. Surprisingly, there is no study analyzing systemat-
ically the relationship between corporate taxation, rm age and debt policy.
This paper tries to ll this gap using a cross-section of manufacturing rms
from 35 European countries.
To derive empirically testable hypotheses about corporate taxation, a rm's
age and its capital structure, we propose a stylized two-period model of op-
1Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2002: p. 175), for instance, argue that "[F]inancing early stage
businesses involves special problems and is fundamentally dierent from nancing mature
and well established companies. Because of lacking collateral and the absence of any past
track record, and due to their informational advantages, pioneering entrepreneurs often face
severe diculties in convincing banks to nance projects with potentially high returns but high
risks as well." In a similar vein, Gordon and Lee (2001: p. 216) emphasize that "[S]mall
rms are more likely to be recent start-ups, that would need to rely much more on outside
loans rather than retained earnings in order to nance new investment."
2timal capital structure choice under corporate taxation. The model analyzes
the change in the nancial structure between the two periods, and, therefore,
allows to investigate the impact of a rm's age on its debt ratio. We demon-
strate that the debt ratio is positively associated with the statutory corporate
tax rate, and that under plausible assumptions older rms rely less on debt
than their younger counterparts. Further, we show that the (positive) impact
of corporate taxation on the debt ratio systematically changes with a rm's
age, motivating an interaction term between the statutory corporate tax rate
and rm age in our empirical analysis.
To test these hypotheses empirically, we use a cross-section of about 405,000
European rms as compiled by the Bureau van Dijk's AMADEUS database.
We regress the debt ratio (dened as current and non-current liabilities over
total assets) on our variables of interest (i.e., the statutory corporate tax rate,
rm age and an interaction thereof) along with other controls (i.e., asset tan-
gibility, rm size, protability, proxies for nancial distress). In line with our
theoretical hypotheses, we nd that a rm's debt ratio is positively inuenced
by the statutory corporate tax rate, and negatively aected by rm age. A
signicantly positive interaction term between rm age and the statutory cor-
porate tax rate indicates that the impact of corporate taxation on the debt
ratio is increasing over a rm's life-time, which is consistent with our theoret-
ical expectation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a
simple theoretical model that allows to derive empirically testable hypotheses
about the relationship between corporate taxation, rm age and debt. Section
3 describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 intro-
duces the econometric specication and presents the empirical results. Section
5 summarizes our main ndings.
2 A simple model of corporate taxation, rm age
and debt nancing
We analyze a rm's investment and nancing decisions in a two period frame-
work (see Poterba and Summers 1985; Myles 1995 and Keuschnigg 2005, pro-
vide excellent textbook treatments). Investors are assumed to be risk-neutral,
investing in a rm or, alternatively, in a risk-less asset earning a given mar-
ket interest rate rt, where t 2 f0;1g denotes a time subscript. Investment
It can be nanced with new debt, BN
t , or with equity via retained earnings,
Et. For simplicity, we rule out nancing via external equity (i.e., new share
issues), and we also abstract from shareholder taxation. Capital Kt is the
3only factor of production, so that output is given by t(Kt), with the usual
assumptions 0(Kt) > 0;00(Kt) < 0. The price of output is normalized to 1.
Then, after-tax dividends are given by
Dt = (1   )[t(Kt)   m(Bt)]   Et; (1)
where  denotes the statutory corporate income tax rate. m(Bt) represents
interest payments on debt. Following previous research, m includes the market
interest rate rt and a risk premium that increases with a rm's debt level,
e.g., due to information asymmetries between borrowers and/or lenders and
other market imperfections (see Stiglitz and Weiss 1981, Fazzari, Hubbard and
Petersen 1988, Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999, Huizinga, Laeven and
Nicod eme 2008, among others). This aspect is captured by the assumptions
that mt = m(Bt), with m0(Bt) > 0 and m00(Bt) > 0 (to satisfy the second
order conditions derived below). Further, the rst unit of debt has to pay the
market interest rate rt, i.e., m(0) = rt.
The capital stock in t = 1 is given by




Similarly, the stock of debt in this period is





Hence, c   1 and g   1 represent the growth rates of debt and the cap-
ital stock. For the sake of brevity and without loss of generality, we ignore
economic depreciation in (2).
Prots after tax and interest are either retained or paid out as dividends.
The initial capital stock, K0, is given and is nanced with initial equity, E0,
and debt, B0. At the end of the second period the rm is liquidated, out-
standing debt is repaid and the value of the remaining assets is paid out to
the shareholders, so that K2 = 0, B2 = 0 and I1 =  K1.
In t = 0, a share e of investment expenditures I0 is immediately deductible
from the tax base, essentially representing an investment tax credit or ex-
tra tax allowances (e.g., accelerated depreciation). Under these assumptions,
4dividends are dened as
D0 = (1   )[0(K0)   m(B0)] + (c   1)B0 | {z }
BN
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We rule out that investment in the rst period exceeds cash ows (i.e.,
prot after tax and interest) plus new debt, implying the side condition
(1   )[0(K0)   m(B0)] + (g   1)K0e + (c   1)B0  (g   1)K0: (5)
The objective of the rm is to maximize its rm value, V0, which is given
by the present value of the dividend stream




with R1 = 1 + r1.
In the following, we focus on investment and nancing choices taken in
t = 1, given the decisions in t = 0 (E0;K0 and B0). First, we maximize (6)
assuming that the side condition of (5) is not binding. The corresponding rst















(1   )m0(cB0) = r1
(1   )0(gK0) + (1 + r1)e = r1: (8)
Based on (8), we can formulate Proposition 1, which provides sucient
conditions for the ratio of debt to capital stock (henceforth debt ratio) to fall
as rms become older.
Proposition 1 If (1 )0(cK0)+(1+r1)e > r1, then the optimal increase
in investment (g) is higher than the optimal increase in debt (c).
Under proposition 1, the debt ratio falls as rms become older. Obviously,
the leverage eect of corporate taxation and interest payments increasing in







(1   )0(gK0) + (1 + r1)e
r1
cB0 gK0
(1   ~ )m0(cB0)
(1   ~ )0(gK0) + (1 + r1)~ e
c0B0 g0K0
(1   )0(cK0) + (1 + r1)e
Figure 1: Side condition is not binding
derlying Proposition 1 is that the after tax marginal returns (including the
investment tax credit) at a constant debt ratio is higher than its opportu-
nity costs r1. This is likely to be the case if rms are protable and the
risk premium increases suciently with the debt level. This result is illus-
trated in Figure 1, which depicts the rst order conditions stated in (8). The
downward-sloping curve refers to the rst-order condition on investment. Its
negative slope follows from the decreasing marginal product of capital. The
upward-sloping curve captures the marginal after-tax interest payments (for
simplicity, we draw this curve as linear). It shows that the rm has an incen-
tive to increase its debt to take advantage of the tax-induced leverage eect.
At m = 0, the after tax interest rate is lower than r1. If the increase in the
interest rate on debt (m0) is suciently large, the leverage eect is limited and
it pays to nance some part of the investment via retained earnings. If the
rm is highly protable and the marginal product after tax at a constant debt
ratio with cK0 is higher than the interest rate r1, older rms (i.e., in period
1) will decrease the debt ratio choosing c < g. Hence, under capital market
imperfections, protable old rms tend to reduce their debt ratio despite the
leverage eect of corporate taxation.2
2Without corporate taxation, the model implies that the investment is exclusively -
nanced by retained earnings. If  = 0, it follows that m
0(cB0) = r1 and 
0(gK0) = r1. In
this case, the marginal product of capital reects the opportunity costs r1. Since m(0) = r1
and m




6To derive the impact of an increase in corporate taxation on the debt ratio,
we totally dierentiate the rst order conditions in (8)
(1   )m00B0dc = m0d












0   (1 + r1)e
(1   )00K0
: (11)














Then, it follows that dc
d > 0 and
dg
d < 0, if 0 > (1 + r1)e. This result can be
formulated in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2 If 0 > (1 + r1)e, c increases and g decreases with .
Proposition 2 implies that the decrease in the debt ratio as predicted in
Proposition 1 for protable rms is more pronounced at a higher . In other
words, the negative age eect is dampened under high corporate tax rates.
Figure 1 illustrates this nding showing that both the debt schedule and the
marginal prot schedule are shifted inwards as  increases from  to ~ . It
should be noted, however, that the conclusion drawn from Proposition 2 only
holds if the investment tax credit is not too large.3
If the side condition is binding, the internal funds of the company are
not sucient to achieve the desired investment level. The corresponding La-
grangian is given by
L = D0 +
D1
R1
  [(g   1)K0   (c   1)B0   (g + 1)K0e   C] (13)
3Inspection of the corresponding rst order conditions shows that this is the case as long
as 
0 > r1.
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=  (g   1)K0 + (c   1)B0 + (g + 1)K0e + C (16)
This case is illustrated graphically in Figure 2. The binding constraint
on internal funds implies that  > 0, so that (1   )m0(cB0) > r1 and (1  
)0(gK0) + (1 + r1)e   r1 > 0. Therefore, a cash constrained rm exhibits
a larger increase in debt and a smaller increase in investment as compared to
the unconstrained one. Denoting the optimal growth rates of the debt ratio
under cash constraints by c and g, respectively, suggests the following
Proposition, which is similar to Proposition 1:
Proposition 3 If (1 )0(cK0)+(1 r1)e > r1, then g > c. However,
c > c and g < g.
Empirically, the propositions imply that one should control for age in ad-
dition to the corporate tax rate in explaining the debt ratio in a cross section
of rms. From Proposition 1 and 3 we expect a negative relationship between
the debt ratio and rm age (i.e., older rms are relying less on debt than
their younger counterparts). Proposition 2 motivates an empirical specica-
tion, where rm age is interacted with the corporate tax rate. We expect that
this interaction term exhibits a positive sign.
3 The data
Data description: We use rm-level data from 35 European countries as
compiled by the Bureau van Dijk's AMADEUS database (Update 146, pub-
lished in November 2006).4 Generally, the AMADEUS database covers bal-
ance sheet information from about 8 million rms over the time period 1993
4In contrast to the earlier versions of the AMADEUS database, there are no inclusion
criteria (minimum number of employees, minimum operating revenue or minimum total
assets) in this version of the database. One obvious advantage of this database is, therefore,







(1   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e
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Figure 2: Side condition is binding
to 2006. The resulting panel of rms is highly unbalanced, and especially in
the early years of coverage the data quality is relatively poor. Therefore, we
focus on a cross-section of 959,125 rms encompassing the years between 1999
and 2004.
In the empirical analysis below, we conne our interest on active companies
in the manufacturing sector (according to NACE 1-digit classication codes
15-37; see Table A.4 for a list of the included industries and the corresponding
sample coverage). To ensure that each rm's nancial statement is unambigu-
ously attributable to the corporate tax rate of a single country, we exclude
consolidated accounts (50,698 rms). As we only focus on corporate taxation,
we drop all unincorporated rms (79,383 rms). The remaining dataset in-
cludes a cross-section of 829,044 rms. From these, we drop the ones with an
operating revenue or total assets below zero (17,069 rms).
Regarding the debt variable, our theoretical model suggests to focus on
debt ratios rather than debt levels or changes in debt levels. The debt ratio
has been frequently used in previous empirical research (see Graham 1999
for a discussion). In our case, the total debt ratio is dened as the sum of
current- and non-current liabilities over total assets. Some studies rely on sub-
components of debt, i.e., long-term and short-term debt (e.g., Booth, Aivazian,
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2001 make extensive use of long-term debt).
To provide a comparison to such studies, we use variants of the total debt
9ratios in a sensitivity check. In our sample, we exclude rms with a total debt
ratio below zero and above 200 percent (14,702 rms).5
Descriptive statistics: Table 1 presents some country-specic stylized facts
about debt, corporate taxation and rm age (Table A.2 provides further de-
scriptives for the whole set of variables and the variable denitions are laid
out in Table A.1). For all three variables together, our sample contains full
information over 541,483 rms in 35 countries and 126 NACE 3-digit indus-
tries. As can be seen from the table, about two thirds of the rm coverage is
due to Spanish, UK, French, Romanian and Italian rms. In three countries
(Cyprus, Malta and Switzerland), rm-level information is only available for
less than 100 rms.6
From Table 1 we can see that the total debt ratio at the country-level is
around 71.6 percent on average, with a minimum of about 36 percent (Cyprus)
and a maximum of about 81 percent (Romania). Most of the countries are
lying within a range of 50 and 70 percent, which is very close to the debt ratios
reported in Rajan and Zingales (1995). The next three columns summarize
the statutory corporate tax rates (including company taxes at the local level)
in 1999 and in 2004 (columns 3 and 4), and the average rate within these
years (column 2). The average corporate tax rate between 1999 and 2004 is
around 32.3 percent, ranging from 10.83 (Ireland) to 41.17 (Germany). Most
of the countries reduced their corporate tax rates considerably within this time
period. On average, the statutory corporate tax rate felt from 35 percent in
1999 to 31 percent in 2004. The most dramatical changes in tax rates took
place in the Slovak Republic (from 40 to 19 percent), in Germany (from 50.1
to 36.4 percent) and in Poland (from 34 to 19 percent). In three countries,
we observe a fairly small increase in corporate tax rates (in Finland from 28
to 29 percent, in Ireland from 10 to 12.5 percent and in Spain from 35 to 35.3
percent).
Firm age is dened as the time period between the year 2006 and the date
of a rm's incorporation. Table 1 illustrates that in our sample the average
rm is about 16.8 years old. As expected, the youngest rms are observed
in the transition economies (e.g., in Romania the average rm is about 8.7
5In the middle- and short-run, a debt ratio above 100 percent might be possible due to
losses in previous periods inducing negative shareholder equity in the current period. To
include such rms in the sample, we set the threshold for the total debt ratio at a value of
200 percent. It turns out that our empirical results are unchanged when applying a threshold
below 200 percent (see the robustness section).
6In the empirical analysis below, we account for the low sample coverage in these countries
by applying a sensitivity check, where all countries with a coverage lower than 500 rms are
excluded.
10Table 1: Average debt ratios, corporate tax rates and rm age per country
Country Debt Corporate tax rate Age Obs. Share in
ratio 99-04 1999 2004 sample
Austria 69.97 34.00 34.00 34.00 21.00 999 0.18
Belgium 68.06 38.11 40.17 33.99 19.56 21,040 3.89
Bosnia and Herzegovina 48.52 30.00 { 30.00 10.62 538 0.10
Bulgaria 63.06 26.58 32.50 19.50 20.18 1,788 0.33
Croatia 64.87 25.00 35.00 20.00 18.80 3,183 0.59
Cyprus 35.99 23.33 25.00 15.00 33.39 23 0.00
Czech Republic 64.39 31.17 35.00 28.00 9.98 9,477 1.75
Denmark 66.93 30.67 32.00 30.00 14.92 8,566 1.58
Estonia 53.23 26.00 26.00 26.00 9.04 5,930 1.10
Finland 58.32 28.83 28.00 29.00 17.23 11,081 2.05
France 71.69 35.82 40.00 34.30 16.30 76,415 14.11
Germany 75.11 41.17 50.08 36.39 24.10 8,723 1.61
Greece 59.77 37.08 40.00 35.00 14.64 6,856 1.27
Hungary 57.47 17.67 18.00 16.00 10.63 3,622 0.67
Iceland 78.66 24.00 30.00 18.00 12.51 1,600 0.30
Ireland 70.43 10.83 10.00 12.50 15.31 8,033 1.48
Italy 76.33 39.75 41.20 37.30 24.04 45,878 8.47
Latvia 66.63 21.83 25.00 15.00 10.39 795 0.15
Lithuania 57.48 20.33 29.00 15.00 9.30 1,458 0.27
Luxembourg 64.58 33.92 37.45 30.38 19.03 247 0.05
Macedonia 57.60 15.00 15.00 15.00 20.64 190 0.04
Malta 53.73 35.00 35.00 35.00 23.63 94 0.02
Netherlands 77.93 34.75 35.00 34.50 27.37 17,651 3.26
Norway 74.99 28.00 28.00 28.00 11.40 10,799 1.99
Poland 60.94 27.67 34.00 19.00 21.69 5,617 1.04
Portugal 72.32 33.55 37.40 27.50 19.95 10,523 1.94
Romania 80.86 27.17 38.00 25.00 8.67 53,894 9.95
Russian Federation 64.82 29.50 35.00 24.00 27.80 7,893 1.46
Serbia and Montenegro 51.77 18.00 20.00 14.00 19.05 2,464 0.46
Slovak Republic 61.97 27.83 40.00 19.00 10.70 1,186 0.22
Spain 74.78 35.05 35.00 35.30 13.87 95,471 17.63
Sweden 62.44 28.00 28.00 28.00 20.21 23,877 4.41
Switzerland 64.09 24.61 25.04 24.37 67.82 11 0.00
Ukraine 45.00 29.17 30.00 25.00 22.69 4,182 0.77
United Kingdom 71.06 30.00 30.00 30.00 17.96 91,379 16.88
Average 71.62 32.34 34.85 30.97 16.81 { {
Notes: The sample includes 541,483 manufacturing rms in 35 countries and 126 indus-
tries (NACE 3-digit classication codes 150-372; see Table A.5 in the Appendix).
11years old). With the exemptions of Switzerland (rm age of about 67.8 years)
and Cyprus (around 33.4 years), for which our sample includes less than 100
rms, the oldest rms are located in the Russian Federation (27.8 years), in
the Netherlands (27.4 years), in Germany (24.1 years) and in Italy (24 years),
on average.
Figure 1 provides further information on the age structure of all rms in
the sample. Moreover, it contains information on the relationship between
total debt ratios and rm age. Specically, we plot the average total debt
ratios against rm age in 10-year age cohorts. The entries in the gure indi-
cate the mean debt ratios of each age cohort, and the whiskers illustrate the
corresponding standard deviations. From the gure, we can draw three im-
portant conclusions regarding the subsequent empirical analysis. First, most
of the total debt ratios are lying within a range of 50 to 70 percent, which is
consistent with Table 1. This warrants the use of a linear specication (rather
than a logistic one) when estimating the impact of rm age and taxation on
debt. Second, up to a rm age of about 300 years we observe considerable
variation in total debt ratios, which seems to be constant over the age co-
horts. Eight rms are older than 300 years, indicating potentially inuential
outliers (the oldest rm is 1,018 years old; interestingly, there is one rm in
the sample with zero leverage and rm age of 526 years; overall we have 5,577
rms with zero debt or about 1 percent of the sample).7 Third, and perhaps
most importantly, the sheer graphical inspection of Figure 1 clearly indicates
a u-shaped relationship between debt and rm age, not only in a sample with
rms younger than 300 years but also in the whole sample (see the regression
lines in the gure). This motivates the inclusion of a quadratic term for rm
age in our regressions.
Regarding the relationship between debt, corporate taxation and rm age,
we observe some countries exhibiting a relatively high total debt ratio com-
bined with a corporate tax rate above the average (e.g., France, Germany,
Italy, or Spain), which is in line with our theoretical expectations. However,
we also identify countries with a high debt ratio along with corporate tax
rates below the average (Iceland and Norway), which is inconsistent with our
hypotheses presented above. Similarly, for some countries we nd that debt ra-
tios are negatively associated with rm age (e.g., in France, Norway or Spain),
but in other ones there is a positive correlation between those variables (e.g.,
in Italy or Portugal). Hence, the country-specic information from Table 1 is
7In the basic regressions, we include all observations in the regressions. As a robustness
check, we account for potentially outlying observations regarding rm age by excluding rms
(i) older than 150 years, and (ii) older than 50 years.
12Figure 3: Average debt ratio per age cohort (stratied sample)
ambiguous on how the variables of interest are interrelated to each other, and
especially on the question whether the impact of corporate taxation on debt
nancing is changing over the life-cycle of a rm.8 In the following, we try to
answer this question more systematically by applying a rm-level regression
analysis.
4 Empirical Analysis
Specication: We are interested in the eects of corporate taxation and
rm age on debt nancing, and on how the inuence of corporate taxation
changes over the life-time of a rm. This motivates an empirical model, where
the debt ratio is regressed on the statutory corporate tax rate, rm age and
an interaction term between those variables. We introduce additional control
variables that are not captured by our stylized model. However, these variables
turned out important from a theoretical and empirical point of view in previous
8This conclusion seems to be conrmed by the correlation matrix in Table A.3, which
is based on the rm- rather than the country-level. There, we observe a partial correlation
coecient of 0.08 between the debt ratio and the average statutory corporate tax rate, and a
value of -0.21 between the total debt ratio and rm age. The correlation coecient between
rm age and the average corporate tax rate is around 0.13.
13research. The econometric specication reads
bijk = 1j + 2Ai + 3A2
i + 4jAi + Zi + k + "ijk; (17)
where i, j, and k are rm-, country- and industry indices, respectively. bijk is
the debt to asset ratio for the ith rm in country j and industry k, j denotes
the statutory corporate tax rate in country j, and Ai is the rm-specic age.
Note that A enters three times in (17): The rst two terms capture a possible
non-linear (in- or decreasing) impact of rm age on debt (according to Figure
3), and the interaction term between rm age and the corporate tax rate allows
to analyze whether the inuence of corporate taxation on debt nancing is
changing over the life time of a rm. From Proposition 2 we expect a positive
estimate for 4.
Zi is a vector of additional rm-specic control variables (including the
constant) suggested by the previous empirical literature (Graham 2003 pro-
vides an excellent survey). k indicate NACE 3-digit industry xed eects
(overall, we include 126 industry dummies) and "ijk is the remainder error
term.
The vector Zi, rstly, comprises asset tangibility as measured by the share
of xed assets in total assets. This variable captures a rm's ability to borrow
against xed assets potentially serving as collateral in case of bankruptcy (see
Rajan and Zingales 1995). Hence, we would expect a positive relationship
between tangibility and debt ratios. On the other hand, DeAngelo and Masulis
(1980) argue that rms with a high share of xed assets may gain from non-
debt tax shields resulting from higher amounts of depreciation and investment
tax credits. Hence, depreciable assets might serve as a substitute for tax
deductible interest payments when rms are trying to minimize their taxable
prots. This, in turn, motivates a negative impact of asset tangibility on debt
nancing. Overall, the sign of this variable remains ambiguous. Further, we
include the size of a rm, dened as the logarithm of sales.9 Graham (1999)
argues that large companies tend to be more diversied and might have more
stable cash ows, making it easier to obtain external funds. In addition, small
rms are faced with higher borrowing costs due to information asymmetries.
For both reasons, we expect that large rms are more likely to be debt nanced
than smaller ones (see also Alworth and Arachi 2001, and Gropp 2002, for
empirical studies).
9Since sales are log-normally distributed in the sample, we use the log of sales in the
regressions (see, e.g., Rajan and Zingales 1995). Alternatively, we include the total number
of employees as size measure. However, we obtain more or less the same parameter estimates
when applying this size measure. Therefore, we do not report the results of this specication
here. The results are available from the authors upon request.
14The next variable in Zi is rm protability as measured by the return on
assets (ROA), which is dened as the ratio of EBIT over total assets, where
EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes (see Fama and French 2002). Our
theoretical model suggests a negative relationship between protability and
debt.10 It should be noted, however, that the previous literature is not en-
tirely clear about the eects of rm protability on debt nancing. On the
one hand, protable rms may use their prots to pay back debt or to nance
investment via retained earnings and, therefore, need less external funds (see
Myers and Majluf 1984, Rajan and Zingales 1995, Gropp 2002). This is ex-
actly the channel raised in our theoretical model and it motivates a negative
relationship between ROA and the debt ratio. On the other hand, protable
rms typically possess free cash ow at their disposal. Some authors argue
that debt nancing in this situation is a meaningful instrument to restrict
managers from undertaking less protable investments (see Jensen 1986). In
this case, we expect a positive parameter estimate for protability.
Finally, following the previous empirical literature explaining debt nanc-
ing, we add three variables informing about the nancial situation of a rm
(see, e.g., MacKie-Mason 1990, Graham 1999 or Alworth and Arachi 2001).
First, we dene a dummy variable with entry one if a rm reports a net op-
erating loss in the period 1999 to 2004, and zero else (henceforth, we refer
to this variable as NOL). Second, we include a dummy variable equal to one
if a company reports negative shareholder funds (NSF), and zero else. Net
operating losses and negative shareholder funds are associated with losses in
previous (NOL) and consecutive (NSF) periods, the vanishing equity reserves
automatically increase the debt position of a rm (see Graham 1999). Hence,
we predict a positive sign on both coecients. Third, the variable Z-score
captures a rm's probability of bankruptcy, and, therefore, the expected -
nancial distress of a rm (see Altman 1968).11 Financial distress aects debt
nancing via two channels. First, highly-leveraged rms are more exposed
to bankruptcy, inducing additional costs (e.g., legal fees). Thus, a company
in nancial distress should be more cautious in using debt. Second, rms in
10In the model, the downward sloping curve of the marginal product of capital is shifted
upwards, inducing an increase of investment, which is entirely nanced via internal funds
(see also Figure 1).
11We follow Graham (1999) to dene the Z-score as












Due to data restrictions, we include shareholder funds instead of retained earnings (as in
Alworth and Arachi 2001).
15Table 2: Estimation results (dependent variable: debt to asset ratio)
Statutory corporate tax rate in the year(s)
1999 2002 2004 99-04
Corporate tax rate (SCTR) 0:476  0:516  0:567  0:558 
(0:010) (0:012) (0:011) (0:013)
Firm age  0:832   0:799   0:729   0:906 
(0:018) (0:036) (0:033) (0:027)
Firm age2 0:003  0:003  0:003  0:003 
(0:0001) (0:0003) (0:0003) (0:0002)
SCTRAge 0:008  0:007  0:006  0:011 
(0:0004) (0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
Asset tangibility  0:036   0:042   0:041   0:038 
(0:002) (0:002) (0:002) (0:002)
Firm size (log of sales) 1:288  0:945  1:039  0:952 
(0:021) (0:022) (0:022) (0:022)
Protability (ROA)  0:150   0:141   0:140   0:142 
(0:005) (0:005) (0:005) (0:005)
Net operating loss (NOL) 6:779  6:548  6:799  6:609 
(0:119) (0:114) (0:115) (0:114)
Negative shareholder funds (NSF) 44:951  45:929  45:743  45:756 
(0:117) (0:122) (0:122) (0:121)
Financial distress (Z-score)  0:016  0:003  0:012  0:004
(0:039) (0:035) (0:037) (0:035)
Observations 404,849 405,373 405,373 405,373
R2 0:436 0:436 0:437 0:438
Industry xed eects: F-statistic 636:00 503:11 485:89 573:12
p-value 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Notes: Constant and industry dummies not reported. White (1980) robust standard errors in
parentheses. ***Signicant at 1%, **Signicant at 5%, *Signicant at 10%.
nancial distress are more likely to pay no taxes in the future, alleviating the
tax-induced advantages of interest deductions from debt nancing. In both
cases, we predict a negative relationship between Z score and the debt ratio.
Estimation results: The empirical results are presented in Table 2. In
all of the empirical models discussed below, we exclude observations with a
remainder error in the upper and lower end 1 percent percentile range (about
40,000 observations of the sample). Correcting for outliers in this way, we are
left with about 405,000 observations.
As discussed above, our sample encompasses a cross-section of rms with
averages over the period 1999 to 2004. Since the corporate tax rate has
changed considerably over time (see Table 1), we estimate several versions
of (17). One, where we use the average corporate tax rate within this period
(column 4), and three further specications applying the statutory corporate
tax rates in 1999 (column 1), in 2002 (column 2) and in 2004 (column 3). It
turns out that the estimation results are less sensitive to these variations in
tax rates, and, therefore, we refer to the results in column 4 when discussing
our empirical results.
16Generally, the model t seems well. The R2 is relatively high, the indus-
try eects are signicant and the control variables are almost as expected.
Asset tangibility enters signicantly negative, which apparently lends sup-
port to the view that xed assets serve as a substitute for debt in our sam-
ple (similar evidence, also based on the AMADEUS database, is provided by
Huizinga, Laeven and Nicod eme 2008). Large rms exhibit higher debt ra-
tios than smaller ones, which is consistent with prior evidence (see Rajan and
Zingales 1995, Alworth and Arachi 2001, and Gropp 2002). Further, protabil-
ity (ROA) has a signicantly negative coecient, indicating that protable
rms tend to reduce their debt position via retaining prots. This nding is
in accordance with the theoretical predictions of our model (and also Myers
and Majluf 1984 and the empirical ndings in Rajan and Zingales 1995 and
Huizinga, Laeven and Nicod eme 2008). Finally, the impact of a rm's nancial
situation on debt nancing seems decisive. As expected, rms with operat-
ing losses that are not cleared by equity injections are relying more on debt.
Similarly, for rms with negative shareholder funds (NSF) we observe higher
debt ratios, which seems plausible as discussed above (see also Graham 1999).
The Z score variable takes the expected negative sign, but is insignicant
throughout.
Regarding our variables of interest, we nd a signicantly positive impact
of corporate taxation on debt ratios as expected. The tax advantage of debt
obviously provokes rms to increase their leverage. In line with Propositions 1
and 3, we nd a negative eect of rm age, indicating that older rms exhibit
lower debt ratios than younger ones, on average. However, as is indicated
by the positive parameter estimate on age squared, there is a u-shaped re-
lationship between rm age and debt nancing. From estimated parameters
of Table 2, we can see that the rm age, where the inuence of age changes
from negative to positive is around 105 years.12 Finally, we observe a posi-
tive interaction term between rm age and the statutory corporate tax rate,
which is signicantly positive in all regressions. This nding seems to conrm
Proposition 2, indicating that the role of corporate taxation on debt nancing
is changing over the life-time of a rm.
Table 3 reports the marginal eects of corporate taxation for the four
versions of (17) presented in Table 2. Taking the specication with the average
corporate tax rate between 1999 and 2004, the marginal eect of corporate
taxation evaluated at the mean of rm age is around 0.73 ( 0:558 + 0:011 
12Taking the rst derivative of (17) with regard to age and setting this expression equal
to zero we obtain
@b
@A = b 2 + 2b 3A + b 4=0. At the mean value of  (0.326 in the sample),
we have a minimum for A at ~ A = (b 2   0:326b 4)=2b 3 = 105:44.
17Table 3: Marginal eect of corporate tax rate 
Firm age SCTR in the year(s)
(99-04) 1999 2002 2004 99-04
Mean 16.59 0.607 0.639 0.660 0.734
Median 13 0.578 0.612 0.640 0.696
Lower 25 percent quartile 8 0.539 0.575 0.612 0.643
Upper 75 percent quartile 20 0.633 0.664 0.679 0.770
Lower 1 percent percentile 2 0.492 0.531 0.578 0.579
Upper 1 percent percentile 81 1.119 1.117 1.019 1.418
Notes: Marginal eects are calculated from the parameter estimates of
Table 2 using
@b
@ = c 1 + b 4A.
16:59), and about 0.7 for a rm with median age. Considering the whole
distribution of rm age, we can see that the marginal eects are within a
range of 0.5 and 0.7 (except values above 1 for rms above the upper 1 percent
percentile range). Accordingly, a change in the statutory corporate tax rate
of 10 percentage points is associated with an increase in the debt ratio by
about 5 to 7 percentage points. Although our empirical model is not directly
comparable to previous research, this marginal eect seems broadly in line
with the evidence presented there. For instance, Gordon and Lee (2001),
focusing on a panel of U.S. rms to analyze the dierential impact of taxation
on debt nancing of small and large rms, nd a slightly lower marginal eect
of about 0.35. In a similar study, Gordon and Lee (2007) estimate a marginal
eect of corporate taxation of 0.47.13
Robustness: We analyze the sensitivity of our results (i) by using dierent
denitions of the debt ratio, (ii) by focusing on alternative tax rate concepts,
and (iii) by restricting our sample in various ways (e.g., by excluding highly
leveraged rms). In all robustness checks, we refer to the specication with
the average corporate tax rate between 1999 and 2004 as reported in the last
column of Table 2. The results of the sensitivity analysis are depicted in Table
4. For the sake of brevity, we only report the variables of interest (, A, A2
and   A) along with the sample size and the R2.
In the rst set of robustness experiments, we use alternative denitions of
the debt ratio based on three sub-components of total liabilities, i.e., (i) short-
term liabilities, (ii) total liabilities excluding trade accounts, and (iii) long-
13Huizinga, Laeven and Nicod eme (2008), focusing on international debt shifting of multi-
national rms using the (small) AMADEUS database (around 18,000 rms), estimate a





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19term liabilities.14 The corresponding debt ratios are restricted to the range
between zero and 200 percent; in each of the regressions we use exactly the
same number of observations (i.e., 390,546 rms). To facilitate a comparison
to our earlier results, we also re-estimate the baseline specication from Table
2, but now with the sample of 390,546 rms. The results of this robustness
exercise are reported in Table 4. A comparison between the last column of
Table 2 and the rst row in Table 4 shows that the parameter estimates of
the baseline specication remain fairly unchanged when focusing on a sample
where all debt ratios are limited to the 0-200 percent range. Then, we rely
on short-term debt, i.e., the ratio of current liabilities to total assets. Such a
specication has been suggested by Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Gordon and
Lee (2001). Not surprisingly (compare the relatively close correlation between
the total debt ratio and the short term debt ratio in Table A.3), we conclude
that the results regarding our main variables of interest are qualitatively very
similar to the ones of the baseline specication. The corporate tax rate enters
signicantly positive (and somewhat lower than in the original model), rm
age exhibits a positive but diminishing impact on debt, and the interaction
term between the corporate tax rate and rm age is signicantly positive.
Next, we deduct trade credits from total liabilities to re-dene the numer-
ator of the debt ratio. Trade credits are typically used by younger rms, espe-
cially to cope with short-term liquidity shortages (see Berger and Udell 1998).
Again, we nd that our results regarding the inuence of corporate taxation
and rm age on debt nancing do not change substantially when relying on
the remaining part of total debt. Finally, we focus on long-term debt (see, e.g.,
Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic 2001). Since rms might
not adjust their long-term liabilities immediately on a year-to-year basis, we
would expect that rm age is less of importance here. We observe a positive
parameter estimate for corporate taxation but a much smaller impact of rm
age as compared to the baseline specication, which seems to conrm this
expectation. The interaction term between the statutory corporate tax rate
and rm age is signicantly positive, again.
In the second set of sensitivity analysis, we refer to an alternative denition
of the tax measure by taking account of loss-carry forwards. Specically, fol-
lowing Graham (1996) and Plesko (2003) we dene ve versions of 'marginal'
tax rates (MCTR). The rst one, MCTR1, is equal to zero if the EBIT within
the observed time period 1999 to 2004 is negative in two or more years. Oth-
14In our sample, the short-term debt ratio is around 58 percent (consisting of 10 percent
loans, 22 percent trade credits, and the remaining 68 percent other current liabilities), and
the long-term debt ratio is around 14 percent.
20erwise, MCTR1 is the same as the statutory corporate tax rate. MCTR2 has
entry zero if the EBIT is lower than zero in three or more years, and equal to
the statutory corporate tax rate else. To compute MCTR3 we account for the
year-by-year realizations of the EBIT. In particular, we set t =SCTR if the
EBIT in a given year is positive, and zero else. Then, MCTR3 is calculated
as the average of t. In MCTR4, we set the marginal corporate tax rate to
equal zero if the EBIT is less than zero in four or more years of the sample
period, and equal to 0:5SCTR if the EBIT is negative in two or three years.
Otherwise, MCTR4 is equal to the SCTR (this variant has been proposed by
Graham 1996). Finally, we dene MCTR5 as equal to zero if the sum of the
EBIT over the whole period is negative, and equal to the statutory corporate
tax rate else.
In all variants of MCTR, our sample includes exactly the same observa-
tions as in Table 2 (i.e., 405,373 rms). Therefore, the estimation results can
be directly compared to the ones in the last column of Table 2. We nd that
the parameter estimates are not strongly varying among the ve variants of
MCTR. This is not surprising given the fact that the correlations between the
MCTRs are relatively high (see Table A.4). Compared to the baseline speci-
cation of Table 2 we now observe much lower coecients for the corporate tax
rate and the rst power of age. However, this comes not really as a surprise,
since we take into account potential tax-loss-carry-forwards. Considering a
non-debt-tax-shield which serves as a substitute for tax-deductible interest
payments, reduces the impact of corporate taxation on debt nancing (see
e.g. DeAngelo and Masulis 1980, Gropp 2002 for empirical evidence). Age
squared still enters positively with signicance levels above the conventional
levels. Finally, with the exception of MCTR5 we nd a signicantly positive
interaction term between rm age and the marginal corporate tax rate, which
is in line with Proposition 2. Regarding the negative interaction term for
MCTR5 one should keep in mind that our sample includes a relatively large
number of rms with zero MCTR5 (about 90,000 rms). This might induce a
downward bias in the interaction term. Therefore, we re-estimate this equa-
tion by only focusing on rms with non-zero marginal tax rates. Applying this
sample restriction, we now observe a signicantly positive interaction. In sum,
the ndings for these robustness experiments are qualitatively very similar to
the previous ones, which let us conclude that the (joint) inuence of corporate
taxation and rm age on debt is obviously insensitive to the change in tax rate
measures.
In the last series of sensitivity exercises, we exclude potentially inuential
outliers from the sample. The corresponding results are summarized in the
21third block of Table 4. First, we reduce the threshold for the total debt ratio
from 200 percent to 100 percent. This reduces the sample by about 44,000
observations. Obviously, the parameter estimates from Table 2 are virtually
unchanged (perhaps one exception is the impact of corporate taxation, which
is slightly higher now). Second, to assess whether the estimated eects of cor-
porate taxation and rm age are aected by the rm age distribution of the
sample (see Figure 3 above), we conne our analysis to rms younger than
150 years (lowering the sample by 246 rms), and, alternatively, to companies
younger than 50 years (losing 14,000 rms). It turns out that this does not
change the tax parameter substantially. We now observe somewhat higher
parameter estimates for rm age (A and A2), and a more pronounced inter-
action term between rm age and corporate taxation, which translates into a
(calculated) turning point of about 49 years (in Table 2, it was around 105
years). Further, as might be suspected by the graphical inspection of Figure 3,
the estimate for the quadratic age term is much higher than in the baseline re-
gression. This, in turn, suggests that the non-linear relationship between rm
age, corporate taxation and debt is more pronounced when excluding very old
rms. All in all, however, the qualitative results regarding the relationship
between corporate taxation, rm age and debt are insensitive to these sample
restrictions.
Finally, one might suspect that our results are driven by the country and
industry coverage. For instance, it is obvious from Table 1 that the sample
coverage is relatively weak for some countries (e.g., Cyprus, Malta or Switzer-
land). Therefore, we drop (i) countries with less than 500 rms (about 260
observations), and (ii) industries with less than 5,000 rms (about 8,000 ob-
servations). Again, we obtain almost the same parameter estimates as in the
original model.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyzes optimal debt nancing of rms under corporate taxation,
which induces an incentive to increase leverage as a result of the deductibility
of interest on debt. The benets from corporate taxation are dampened by the
costs of nancial distress arising from increased debt levels. We argue that a
rm's leverage might change over the life-cycle of a rm. For example, younger
rms exhibit higher debt ratios and nd it more dicult to raise external
nancing sources. This, in turn, suggests that the debt ratios are changing
over a rm's life-time, and also that the impact of corporate taxation is age
dependent.
22We provide a simple two period model with corporate taxation and endoge-
nous nancing decisions that allows to derive empirically testable hypotheses
regarding the relationship between corporate taxation, rm age and debt -
nancing. We test these hypotheses in a cross section of 405,000 rms from 35
European countries and 126 NACE 3-digit industries. Our empirical ndings
can be summarized as follows. First, and in line with previous research, we
nd a positive impact of corporate taxation on a rm's debt ratio, suggesting
that the corporate tax system provides an incentive for higher leverage. Sec-
ond, rm age exerts a negative impact on debt ratios, indicating that older
rms are relying less on debt than younger ones. Finally, we observe a sig-
nicantly positive interaction eect between corporate taxation and rm size.
This result implies that the debt ratio of younger rms is much less aected
by a cut in corporate tax rates than that of older rms. This, together with a
signicantly negative coecient of a quadratic age term, lend support to the
view that the eects of corporate taxation on debt nancing is changing over
the life-time of a rm.
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Michael Pfaffermayr, Matthias Stöckl and Hannes Winner 
 
Capital Structure, Corporate Taxation and Firm Age 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyzes the relationship between capital structure, corporate taxation 
and firm age. We adapt a standard model of optimal capital structure choice under 
corporate taxation, focusing on the financing and investment decisions a young firm 
is typically faced with. Our model allows to derive testable hypotheses about the 
relationship between corporate taxation, a firm's age and its debt to asset ratio. To 
test these hypotheses empirically, we use a cross-section of 405,000 firms from 35 
European countries and 126 NACE 3-digit industries. In line with previous research, 
we find that a firm's debt ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. Further, we 
observe that older firms exhibit smaller debt ratios than their younger counterparts. 
Finally, consistent with our theoretical expectation, we find a positive interaction 
effect between corporate taxation and firm age, indicating that the impact of 
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